Abstract-Code injection vulnerabilities are a major threat to Internet security. The ability for a malicious website to install malware on a host using these vulnerabilities without its knowledge is particularly menacing. In this paper, we approach this problem from a new perspective by constructing a Markov chain graph from the system calls Internet Explorer executes and then modeling this graph over time. We apply a Gaussian process change-point algorithm to detect code injection attacks. To show the efficacy of this approach, we collect a novel dataset of system call traces of 6 code injection attacks using 3 distinct exploits against the Internet Explorer browser. Our algorithm was able to detect all of the code injection attacks with a limited number of false positives.
I. INTRODUCTION
Code injection attacks have become a serious threat over the past decade and are capable of infecting millions of hosts within a few days [1] . These attacks work by sending malicious input to a program that then typically exploits a buffer overflow or format string exploit to gain control of the execution of that program by hijacking the instruction pointer. The malicious input is known as shellcode, which is a machine readable string for a particular computer architecture.
Most of the algorithms used to detect code injection attacks work by analyzing the network flow data [11] , [12] , [2] , [6] . Although these network-based methods have shown great promise in mitigating this family of vulnerabilities, they are far from a complete solution. We aim to create a host-based method that will be able to work in tandem with these previously developed methods.
We approach this problem using online change-point detection methods [16] , [8] . The general idea is to collect a sequence of system calls that Internet Explorer executes within a certain time interval and model them as a Markov chain. In the Markov chain, the states are the system calls and the transition probabilities are estimated given the trace data. We then look at how the Markov chain changes between different time intervals. Our hypothesis is that once a program has been hit with a code injection attack, the Markov chain for that time interval should be substantially different and we will be able to detect a change-point. Our novel contributions are two-fold, first transforming the system call trace data into a Markov chain representation, and second applying online change-point detection methods to find code-injection attacks in real-time.
With the change-point detected, the administrator can then choose to shut down the program or take other preventative measures. This has the key advantage of stopping the malicious code before it spreads to other hosts on the network saving the administrator both time and money. It also does not rely on signature based detection which would fail given 0-day exploits or highly polymorphic code [13] .
We use a novel dataset of 6 code injection attacks using 3 distinct exploits generated by Metasploit [7] to test the efficacy of our approach. We found that we were able to detect the code injection attacks with a minimal number of false positives. Although these false positives would be prohibitive on a real system, we believe that these results show great promise for this method.
II. RELATED WORK
System calls have a long history of being used for detecting anomalous behavior in running processes. In one of the first attempts at analyzing system calls for intrusion detection [9] , Hofmeyr et al. began by collecting a database of k-length sequences under normal operating conditions. To determine whether a new sequence is anomalous, they use the minimum Hamming distance between the new sequence and all sequences contained in the database of normal usage. Our work differs in that we use a Markov chain representation for a sequence of system calls and use a change-point detection algorithm to avoid the need of having a predefined database of normal usage.
One of the first attempts to specifically target codeinjection attacks involved using instruction-set randomization [11] . Here they randomize the instruction-set by rearranging the opcode-instruction relationship. When foreign code tries to execute, the transformation of the opcode to an instruction will raise an exception. The main disadvantage to this approach is that it requires special support for the processors and, thus, is not a general purpose solution.
In [12] , the authors take a more preemptive approach, scanning network traffic and then trying to execute it on a virtual machine. During the execution of the potential code, they use several heuristics, such as looking at the memory usage of a process and the system calls it makes, to determine if the code is malicious or not. This work complements our work as it would be a first line of protection and ours would be a secondary measure. This approach is somewhat limiting as it is possible for malicious code to detect virtual machines and alter their behavior [4] .
III. DATA COLLECTION

A. Environment
We performed all of our experiments using the Xen virtual machine [3] with the machine running behind a firewall. This provided us with a sterile environment to run our experiments with little risk of contaminating other machines on the network. To implement the exploits, we used the Metasploit framework [7] . Metasploit allowed us the flexibility of choosing pre-written exploits and then setting up a webserver to host the exploits. This mechanism allowed us to quickly run several different types of exploits without having to worry about the underlying architecture of the exploits. Finally, we used STraceNT [15] to collect the system call traces of Internet Explorer.
B. Exploits
We selected three different exploits within the Metasploit framework to base our datasets on. Aurora takes advantage of an invalid pointer reference within Internet Explorer to seize control of the instruction pointer and execute arbitrary code. It then creates a backdoor connection to a command and control server hosted by Metasploit. dllloader uses the fact that Windows calls DLLs with relative paths instead of absolute paths. It presents a link to the user that when downloaded also downloads a DLL with the same name as one that Internet Explorer normally calls. This allows the malicious code to be executed. Unsafe Scripting uses a stack buffer overflow exploit in the ActiveX plug-in associated with Internet Explorer to seize control of the instruction pointer and execute arbitrary code.
These three choices of exploits illustrate different types of attacks which allowed us to test our method in a variety of code injection scenarios. Aurora exploits Internet Explorer directly, dllloader exploits the users naivety and a flaw in the Windows OS, and Unsafe Scripting exploits a plug-in associated with Internet Explorer.
C. Methodology
With our environment set up and the exploits selected, we began to collect system call traces. We collected two samples for each exploit varying the time until exploit. We manually ran Internet Explorer for 10 or 15 minutes performing normal user activity. We did things such as visited several websites, downloaded an mp3, saved a webpage, etc. Then we initiated the exploit in Metasploit and visited the website created by Metasploit. After the exploit has finished loading, we continued to run Internet Explorer for another 5 or 10 minutes so that the time for our total trace is 20 minutes.
D. Data Transformation
A graph, G = V, E , is composed of two sets, V and E. The elements of V are called vertices and the elements of E are called edges. In our representation, the edge weight, e ij , between vertices i and j corresponds to the transition probability from state i to state j in a Markov chain, hence, we require the edge weights for edges originating at v i to sum to 1,
i j e ij = 1. We use an n × n (n = |V |) adjacency matrix to represent the graph, where each entry in the matrix, a ij = e ij .
To find the edges of the graph, we first scan the system call trace, keeping counts for each pair of successive system Figure 2 : Synthetic results where a malicious trace is inserted into a benign trace at two separate points. These results were based on instruction traces rather than system call traces. Red line indicates ground-truth change-point.
calls. After filling in the adjacency matrix with these values, we normalize the matrix such that all of the non-zero rows sum to one. This process of estimating the transition probabilities ensures us a well-formed Markov chain. Figure  1 shows a snippet of trace data with a resulting fragment of a hypothetical instruction trace graph.
IV. CHANGE-POINT DETECTION
Our method for change-point detection uses ideas based on a Bayesian approach using Gaussian processes as the underlying predictive model (UPM) [16] . The basic approach relies on finding:
which is the probability of a run-length of length t, r t , given all the data we have seen up to that point, x 1:t . In our example, each x i is a Markov chain built with the system calls collected in the ith time interval and p(r t |x 1:t ) can be thought of as the belief that we have been affected by malware during r t . The joint likelihood, p(r t , x 1:t ) can be updated with a recursive message passing framework:
(2) where p(r t |r t−1 ) is the hazard function (which we set to 1 as we have no a priori information on the run-length before a potential attack), p(x t |x 1:t−1 ) is computed using our Gaussian Process UPM, and p(r t−1 , x 1:t−1 ) is recursively computed.
To define our Gaussian process UPM, we need to establish a way to handle our time-series data in a meaningful way. A Gaussian process can be thought of as an infinite dimensional Gaussian that is specified by a mean function, typically set to 0, and a covariance function [14] . An intuitive way to define a time-series based Gaussian process is to use the time index, t, as the input to the GP, and use the data at time t, x t , as the output [8] . This allows us to define our UPM as:
where
The main difference between this approach and the standard approach is that the mean function uses x as the function values instead of y, where y is usually the output of the function that is trying to be predicted. The covariance function we use is the Gaussian:
which looks at the local changes between the transition probabilities between two Markov chains.
V. RESULTS
A. Toy Results
To gauge the efficacy of our algorithm, we first tuned it on a synthetic dataset. We used two instruction traces, rather than system call traces, that we collected. The first was a trace of a benign Windows program and the second a trace of a malicious program. We placed two bins of the malicious program at two different points in the benign trace. The bins were composed of 5,000 instructions which we used to construct our Markov chains. Figure 2 shows our results. We can see that we were able to recover both change-points using our method.
B. Aurora
For the Aurora results, we used system calls to construct the Markov chains. The bins were composed of 10,000 system calls. Figure 3 highlights these results, with (a) being a 15/5 minute split and (b) being a 10/10 minute split. Like the synthetic results, we were able to detect the changepoint associated with performing the exploit. In Figure 3 (a) the change-point is easily noticed, whereas in Figure 3 
C. dllloader
While the dllloader results are reassuring in the sense that they are able to detect the insertion of malicious code, we run into the problem of false-positives which no appropriate false-positive threshold could avoid. Figure 4 presents the results for both time splits. We can see that the changepoint algorithm finds the change-point in both runs, but false-positives are equally likely under this model.
D. Unsafe Scripting
Our final experiment used the Unsafe Scripting exploit in the ActiveX plug-in of Internet Explorer. These results are presented in Figure 5 . Our algorithm performed the worst on this dataset as there were examples of false-positives that had a higher likelihood than the true positive we initiated. We mention ideas in Section VI to mitigate these problems.
VI. FUTURE WORK
Given the results in Figure 2 , it is plausible that using instruction traces rather than system call traces might lead to improved performance. This would make sense as the size of the vertex set for the instruction traces is ∼160 whereas the size of the vertex set for the system call traces is ∼600. With a smaller vertex set, we can make more accurate estimations for the transition probabilities of the Markov chains and have more accurate predictions from the Gaussian process regressor of Equation 3 .
We based our Gaussian process covariance function on the Gaussian kernel for simplicity. Using more complex kernels, such as spectral kernels [5] or random walk kernels [10] , could lead to a more descriptive covariance function which would in turn lead to a more accurate change-point detection algorithm.
The change-point detection algorithm we used was developed with the aim of making more accurate predictions in the presence of change-points, while the goal of this project is to simply find a change-point associated with a code injection attack. It would be interesting to look at simpler change-point detection models. We could potentially find a baseline Markov chain for normal Internet Explorer behavior and compare our time bins to that model to identify anomalous behavior.
All of the code injection attacks that we examined in this paper were based on the Internet Exporer browser. We should be able to easily generalize this method to all browsers. To test this, we will need to collect more code injection data on a variety of browsers, i.e. Firefox, Safari, Opera, etc.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated the application of a Gaussian process change-point model [16] to the problem of identifying a code injection attack against the Internet Explorer browser. To show the efficacy of this approach, we collected 6 novel datasets on 3 distinct exploits. Using system call traces to condition the transition probabilities of Markov chains, we were able to locate the change-points caused by these exploits. Unfortunately, with our current model, we also found several false-positives. Despite these false-positives, we believe this line of research to be worthwhile and a valuable starting off point for techniques to defend against code injection attacks.
